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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine these scenarios:' (1) a man witnesses the death of his
long-term live-in lover when she is thrown from the car in which they
are riding;2 (2) a mother observes the staff in a reformatory infirmary
ignore her son's ultimately fatal illness;3 (3) a man on a railroad work
crew sees his very close friend die of a heart attack and is forced to
work in full view of the covered body;4 (4) a mother and father arrive
a few minutes after an accident involving a car in which their
daughters were riding and find their daughters' lifeless bodies still
inside.5 In all of these cases, the people saw someone close to them
die as a direct result of the negligence of a third party; it was arguably
foreseeable that they would suffer severe emotional distress as a
result. In these cases, the witnesses' emotional trauma was arguably
as much a part of the horror of the accident as the victims' physical
injuries. Yet under California law some would recover damages and
others would not.
This Comment will concentrate on "third-party" negligent
infliction of emotional distress (NIED) cases in which a person6
suffers a severe physical injury as the result of the negligence of the
tortfeasor, and another person7 suffers severe emotional distress as
a result of the injury to the victim.
California's approach to NIED recovery divides third-party claims
into two general categories. First are "bystander" cases, which arise
when the plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress as a result of
observing the injury or death of another person negligently caused by
a tortfeasor.8 To recover in bystander cases, a non-physically-injured
plaintiff needs to meet three requirements: The plaintiff must observe
and be physically near the accident, be aware that the accident caused
1. Many of the cases in this Comment are cited to offer examples of fact-based
scenarios involving injuries and their effect on people who are close to the victim. While
many of these cases turn on issues other than negligent infliction of emotional distress
(NIED), their facts provide a useful tool to analyze actual facts under the proposed NIED
standard advanced by this Comment.
2. Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
3. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
4. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
5. Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).
6. Hereinafter called "victim."
7. Hereinafter called "plaintiff."
8. E.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 Pld 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661
(1985); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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physical injury to the victim, and be closely related by blood or
marriage to the victim. Second are "direct victim" cases in which
the plaintiff was a "direct victim" of the defendant's conduct in which
the defendant breached a duty not to cause emotional distress."
Plaintiffs in both types of cases can recover for emotional distress
without suffering any physical injury."
The courts are confused about when to apply each of these
tests.1 2  In an attempt to balance competing-and contradicto-
ry-policy concerns, courts over time have expanded and then
constricted both the bystander test 3 and the direct victim test. 4
9. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644,667-68,771 P.2d 814,829-30,257 Cal. Rptr. 865,
880-81 (1989).
10. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 48 Cal. 3d 583, 590, 770 P.2d
278, 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98,102 (1989); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616
P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
11. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 924-30, 616 P.2d at 817-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835-39;
Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. Damages for negligent
infliction of emotional distress can also be "parasitic" to physical injury suffered by the
plaintiff. Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 981, 863 P.2d 795, 805,
25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550,560 (1993); see also Easton v. United Trade Sch. Contracting Co., 173
Cal. 199, 203, 159 P. 597, 599 (1916) (holding that "mental suffering and mental anguish"
are "element[s] of damage[s]" which aggravate physical injuries).
12. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 182, 703 P.2d at 17, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 676-77 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting) ("What has followed in Dillon's wake is confusion rather than clarity."). Chief
Justice Bird also noted that the Molien direct victim test "has spawned confusion." Id. at
187, 703 P.2d at 20, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
13. Soon after Dillon was decided, a court of appeal allowed a mother to recover
when she arrived a few minutes after her son was maimed by a gunpowder explosion.
Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253,79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). However, in 1980
another court of appeal denied recovery to a mother and father who arrived at the scene
of their son's fatal electrical accident a few minutes after it occurred. Hathaway v.
Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980). In 1985 the California
Supreme Court recognized a mother's right to recover when her son died because the staff
in a reformatory infirmary ignored his fatal illness, even though the mother might not have
seen the son's death or the events that actually caused it. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39
Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985). In 1988 the court denied recovery to
a man who witnessed the death of his long-term live-in lover. Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal.
3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988). In 1989 the court denied recovery to a
mother who arrived at the scene of an accident to find her son seriously injured. Thing
v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
14. E.g., Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d
278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989) (expanding NIED by recognizing cause of action of mothers
whose sons were sexually molested by a therapist); Wiggins v. Royale Convalescent Hosp.,
158 Cal. App. 3d 914, 206 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1984) (constricting NIED by denying recovery to
the wife of a nursing home patient who fell out of bed because the rails on the patient's
bed were negligently left lowered).
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This Comment will analyze NIED claims caused by accidents and
medical malpractice in which the victim suffers a grave physical injury
because of the defendant's negligence." Part II argues that there is
a need to continue awarding NIED damages. 6 Part III provides a
brief history of NIED jurisprudence. Part IVA proposes a new test
that properly values the complexities and interests at stake in an
NIED claim and Part IV.B compares the proposed test with other
tests.
II. TORT DAMAGES PLAY IMPORTANT SOCIAL ROLE
Tort damages in general serve important societal functions. 7
Our political and economic system does not "provide assurances that
each of our injured citizens will have the appropriate health care and
money for necessary living expenses."'" NIED damages compensate
people for the very real harm they suffer as a result of emotional
trauma resulting from death or terrible injury to someone close to
them, which can be as devastating to a person's well-being as a
physical injury. 9 Moreover, a court's refusal to allow damages for
a harm effectively grants the person who caused the injury a legal
right to do so. °
15. Other forms of professional malpractice are beyond the scope of this discussion.
See, e.g., Joseph J. Kelleher, Note, An Attorney's Liability for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1309 (1990) (arguing that attorneys should be
liable when their negligence causes injury to a personal interest).
16. Some courts have openly criticized awarding NIED damages to bystanders. Thing,
48 Cal. 3d at 673, 771 P.2d at 833, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 884 (Kaufman, J., concurring). Justice
Kaufman called for a "wholesale reappraisal of the wisdom" of allowing third party NIED
damages because the majority opinion was unjustly rigid and the Dillon test had spawned
"confusion and inconsistency of results." Id. at 670, 771 P.2d at 833, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 882
(Kaufman, J., concurring).
17. See Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE LJ. 848. Monetary damages can make up lost
wages, which are not covered by medical insurance. Id. at 873. While concededly falling
short of the mark, tort damages may also help somewhat in restoring an injured person's
dignity by sending a societal message that their suffering matters to society as a whole.
Id. at 873-74. Bender sharply criticizes the way in which the law "monetarizes" and
"commodifies" people's injuries, id. at 864-78, but she also notes that "the legal system has
been silent about alternatives" to money damages, id. at 875.
18. Id at 872-73. If people had access to health care and income while they were
disabled or in need of treatment, tort litigation for injuries to a person's health could be
rendered superfluous. Id
19. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 933, 616 P.2d 813, 823, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 841 (1980).
20. Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L.
REv. 772, 781 (1985).
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The reasons advanced for categorically refusing NEED damages
in which plaintiffs were not physically injured are outmoded."
Scholars have found Americans' often-bemoaned "litigiousness"' to
be more anecdotal than real.' In spite of widely held perceptions
about doctors' need to practice so-called "defensive medicine" to
avoid lawsuits,24 there is no medical malpractice liability crisis.'
21. See Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1958), overruled by Niederman v.
Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970). The Bosley court denied NIED recovery because "[ijn
most cases, it would be impossible for medical science to prove that these subjective
symptoms could not possibly have resulted from ... fright or nervous shock." Bosley, 142
A.2d at 267. The Bosley court also feared a "tremendous number" of false claims. Id.
In overruling Bosley, the Niederman court noted that "advancement in the medical arts
should and could be legitimately reflected in changes in the legal field." Niederman, 261
A.2d at 86. As for the concern over false claims, the Niederman court noted "we are
unable to accept the proposition that our courts and the judicial system in general cannot
deal with fraudulent claims when they arise." 1d. at 88.
22. Americans' alleged litigiousness has been blamed for inhibiting the development
of small business, Charles Burck, Fighting His Way Back, FORTUNE, Oct. 18, 1993, at 172;
loss of the United States' competitiveness in international sports, John J. Fialka, Faster.
Higher. Stronger. But With a Bit Less Risk, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1992, at A13; the
decline of the virtues of individualism and common sense, Jesse Birnbaum, Crybabies:
Eternal Victims, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 16; and making Americans overly risk-averse,
American Competitiveness, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1991, at A6.
23. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,
31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 10-11 (1983) (expressing skepticism that an increase in federal court
suits, "monster cases," "atrocity stories," and "war stories" provide reliable evidence of
American litigiousness); Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the
Institute for Civil Justice's Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 481-83 (1987) (observing that
tort claims for most commonly filed cases, such as auto accidents, have long been and
continue to be relatively stable both in amounts of damages and frequency of filing while
"mass toxic" and other sensational cases have grown in number but represent a small
fraction of the total number of cases filed).
24. Defensive medicine is the practice in which doctors perform unnecessary
procedures to cover themselves in the event they are later sued for malpractice. James P.
Driscoll & William Summers, What We Need Is Real Tort Reform-Not Snake Oil, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1993, at B7. Defensive medicine has been blamed for increasing the cost
of medical care in the United States; see, eg., Ann R. Dowd, Fixing Clinton's Health Care
Plan, FORTUNE, Apr. 4, 1994, at 83, 85 (commenting that tens of billions of dollars a year
are added to health costs by unnecessary procedures).
25. Kenneth Jost, Still Warring Over Medical Malpractice, A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 68.
Some commentators argue that the costs of malpractice are manageable. See, e.g., Stephen
Budiansky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 30, 1995,
at 52 (noting medical malpractice claims constitute only 10% of lawsuits); Wasted Health
Care Dollars, 57 CONSUMER REP., 435, 443 (1992) (discussing American Medical
Association study in mid-1980s that determined that total cost of medical malpractice,
"including premiums and defensive medicine, was about 17 percent of physicians'
earnings").
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Courts should continue to award NIED damages. Since fears of
unlimited liability and a litigation crisis are largely illusory, refusal to
award NIED damages amounts to a heartless unwillingness to make
tortfeasors accept responsibility for their actions.
III. BACKGROUND: NIED HISTORY
A. The Old Common Law
Historically, common law courts generally shunned damage
awards for emotional distress.26 Courts feared that juries "may well
become bewildered, take refuge in the terms of their own experience,
and simply deliver a verdict according to their liking."'27
Courts developed the impact rule which allowed a plaintiff
damages for NIED if that plaintiff suffered some kind of physical
harm.-8 By the 1930s courts awarded non-physically-injured plaintiffs
damages for NIED if they were in a zone of danger close to the
accident.29 The plaintiffs' reasonable fear for their personal safety
would ensure the genuineness of their claim and NIED damages were
therefore reasonable.30
26. See, e.g., Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 56 N.E. 917, 920 (Ind. App.
1900) (refusing recovery for fright or its consequences because damages were too remote
and speculative); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354,354-55 (N.Y. 1896), overruled by
Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961) (fearing "flood of litigation" from awarding
damages for emotional distress); Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263, 267 (Pa. 1958),
overruled by Neiderman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970) ("For every wholly genuine
and deserving claim, there would likely be a tremendous number of illusory or imaginative
or 'faked' ones.").
27. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 308, 379 P.2d 513, 521,
29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40 (1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
28. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2406 & n.6 (1994) (the
earliest of three major limiting tests in NIED cases was the "physical impact" test (citing
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896))).
29. Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 584, 97 P.2d 434, 435 (1939). Some courts
continue to adhere to the zone of danger rule. E.g., Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668, 670
(Ariz. 1979); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983); Stadler v. Cross,
295 N.W.2d 552, 553-55 (Minn. 1980); Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp., 799
S.W.2d 595, 599 (Mo. 1990); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 847-49 (N.Y. 1984);
Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678,684 (N.D. 1972); Shelton v. Russell Pipe &
Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861, 864-66 (Tenn. 1978); Boucher v. Dixie Medical Ctr., 850
P.2d 1179, 1181-82 (Utah 1992); Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 362 N.W.2d 137, 141-43
(Wis. 1985).
30. See Claudia Wrazel, Note, Limiting Liability for the Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: The "Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 847,852 (1981).
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B. The Corpse Cases: Defining Inherently Sensitive Situations
An exception to courts' usual reluctance to award NIED damages
arose in cases where plaintiffs suffered emotional distress from the
negligent delivery of death notification telegrams31 and from the
negligent mishandling of a corpse when the plaintiff was a close
relative of the deceased.2  Courts appeared to have justified their
holdings in such cases based on "respect for the dead.
33
Courts also awarded NIED damages to people who received
negligently delivered telegrams if the telegram informed the plaintiff
of a close relative's death. For example, in Stuart v. Western Union
Telegraph Co.,34 the defendants were negligently late in delivering a
telegram informing the plaintiff of his brother's impending death. 5
This delay prevented the plaintiff from being with his brother in the
last hours of the brother's life. 6
A recent decision illustrates the California courts' present
deference towards the relatives of the deceased. 7 In Queseda v.
Oak Hill Improvement Co.,38 the court found that a sister and a
niece of the decedent had a cause of action for NIED when the
31. Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1885).
32. See, e.g., Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 876, 820 P.2d 181, 183, 2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 79, 81 (1991) (holding that a funeral director's duty not to mishandle human
remains extends only to close family members "on whose behalf or for whose benefit the
services were rendered").
33. E.g., Kyles v. Southern Ry., 61 S.E. 278, 281 (N.C. 1908) (noting that "[r]espect
for the dead is an instinct that none may violate" and ordering a new trial on the issue of
emotional distress suffered when 15 or more trains operated by railroad negligently ran
over plaintiff's husband's body).
34. Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351 (Tex. 1885).
35. Id. at 353.
36. Id
37. Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 261 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1989). Other jurisdictions are also sympathetic. See, eg., Tomasits v. Cochise Memory
Gardens, Inc., 721 P.2d 1166, 1167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (awarding damages to family
members when cemetery moved relatives' remains without plaintiff's permission);
Contreraz v. Michellotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1123 (Mont. 1995) (finding relatives of
decedent had standing to sue for NIED when embalming fluid leaked through the
decedent's clothes during the funeral); Jacobs v. Calvary Cemetery & Mausoleum, 756 P.2d
334, 335-36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding a $200,000 NIED award to parents whose
five-year-old daughter's body was removed from its burial crypt before a capstone was
installed); Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438,443 (W. Va. 1985)
(holding plaintiff had a cause of action for NIED when defendant negligently lost relatives'
remains as result of disinterment for highway construction).
38. Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 596, 261 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1989).
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defendant funeral home and county allegedly replaced the corpse of
their relative with that of another person.39 The court found that it
was "not only foreseeable but inevitable" that "close friends and
family members" present at a funeral would be emotionally trauma-
tized by negligent mishandling of the decedent's corpse.
4
0
The courts' rationale for NIED damages in the corpse cases is
easily justified. First, the contractual relationship imposes a duty on
the funeral director to the plaintiff. Thus, the harm and the damages
were limited to the people who entered into the contract, which
limited the payouts of damages to close relatives of the decedent. But
the corpse cases suggest something more. The death of a relative is
an emotionally charged time, which eliminates any doubt as to the
genuineness of the NIED claim. This unusual, highly emotional
scenario with limited participants precludes endless liability.
C. Dillon Allowed Bystander Recovery
When it decided Dillon v. Legg4 in 1968, the California
Supreme Court repudiated the zone of danger rule.42 The court
awarded damages to a woman outside the zone of danger who saw
the defendant's car roll over her infant child.43
Though the plaintiff mother in Dillon was in no danger herself,
the court found that the grief she suffered for her child was "as likely
to cause physical injury as concern over [her] own well-being.""
This caused her to suffer a "shock which resulted in physical
injury."'45 The court did not consider fraudulent claims to be a
serious problem.46 But the Dillon court was still concerned about
limiting liability,47 so it articulated a three-prong test to provide
guidelines to determine NIED liability on a case-by-case basis.' The
first prong examined the plaintiff's proximity to the scene of the
accident.4 9 The second examined whether or not the plaintiff had
39. Id at 599, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
40. Id. at 606, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
41. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
42. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 736, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
45. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
46. Id. at 736, 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
47. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
48. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
49. 1 at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident.5" The third
prong required the plaintiff to have a close relationship with the
victim.
51
The Dillon court deliberately left determination of the parame-
ters of the prongs open to further interpretations by courts. 52 This
resultant lack of a coherent analytical framework left potential
litigants with "no means short of suit" to determine liability in cases
that did not exactly match Dillon's fact pattern.53
Another downfall of the Dillon test was its flexibility.54 While
it provided general analytical guidelines, Dillon failed to articulate
ways to flesh them out. For example, the court's "requirement" of
considering the plaintiff's contemporaneous observance of the
accident begged more questions than it answered. Did contemporane-
ous mean presence at the exact scene of the accident, or did it mean
arrival a moment, ten minutes, an hour, or a day afterward?
5
Plaintiffs in a wide range of cases tried to invoke the Dillon reasoning
in a variety of imaginative arguments.
56
50. lId at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
51. At. at 741, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
52. Id., 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
53. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 655, 771 P.2d 814, 821,257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 872
(1989).
54. See, eg., id. at 654, 771 P.2d at 819, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (calling standards in
Dillon "amorphous").
55. See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59,562 P.2d 1022,137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977)
(holding that plaintiff need not visually perceive the victim's injury); Hathaway v. Superior
Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980) (denying recovery to parents whose
child was electrocuted by touching a cooler because the child was not touching the cooler
at the time they came on the scene); Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146
Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978) (denying parents recovery when they arrived at an accident scene
a few minutes after their daughters had died); Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d
253, 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1969) (allowing recovery for mother arriving after an
explosion that mangled her son's hands). Many jurisdictions declined to adopt the Dillon
test. Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062,1070 (D.C. 1990); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Il. 1983); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552,553-55 (Minn. 1980); Asaro
v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595,599 (Mo. 1990); Bovsun v. Sanperi,
461 N.E.2d 843, 847-49 (N.Y. 1984); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684
(N.D. 1972); Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861,864-66 (Tenn. 1978);
Boucher v. Dixie Medical Ctr., 850 P.2d 1179, 1181-82 (Utah 1992); Garrett v. City of New
Berlin, 362 N.W.2d 137, 141-43 (Wis. 1985).
56. Most attempts by plaintiffs to invoke the Dillon test were futile. See, e.g., Wynne
v. Orcutt Sch. Dist., 17 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1110,95 Cal. Rptr. 458,459 (1971) (holding that
parents of fatally ill child had not alleged any duty on the part of a teacher not to tell the
child's classmates about his illness). But see Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App. 3d
844, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39, 45 (1970) (holding that plaintiff's emotional distress when jeweler
lost her heirloom rings was the type of injury to the "nervous system ... held to be
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D. Molien Allowed "Direct Victim" Recovery
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,57 the court allowed
recovery for NIED to plaintiffs who were not present at the scene of
the injury to the victim.58 The plaintiffs wife had been erroneously
diagnosed with syphilis by the defendant hospital. 9 The plaintiff's
wife believed that the plaintiff was having an extramarital affair and
had given her the diseaseP0 Mr. Molien suffered no physical
injury." Rather, he sued for NIED caused by the defendant's
negligent diagnosis.62 Mr. Molien was not present when the doctor
told Mrs. Molien that she had syphilis.63 Nevertheless, the risk of
harm was "reasonably foreseeable" 64 because the defendant doctor's
conduct was "directed to him" as well as his wife.65
Like the corpse cases, Molien involved a particularly emotion-
laden subject: venereal disease.6 Also, like the corpse cases, Molien
involved a relationship of trust which was disrupted when the doctor
made the erroneous diagnosis.
E. Thing Constricts Dillon Test
In Thing v. La Chusa,6 7 the California Supreme Court tried to
narrow the Dillon test. After a highly critical recital of "post-Dillon
decisions, 61 the court announced that it had an "opportunity to meet
its obligation to create a clear rule" for NIED liability.
69
In Thing, the plaintiff mother neither saw nor heard the
defendant's car strike her son, John.' She failed Dillon's require-
compensable in... Dillon").
57. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
58. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
59. 1d. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
60. Id. at 920, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
61. I& at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
62. Id- at 920, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833. Mr. Molien also sought damages
for loss of consortium. Ie at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
63. Id. at 921, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
64. Id at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
65. Id.
66. I& at 931,616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (citing Schessler v. Keck, 125 Cal.
App. 2d 827, 271 P.2d 588 (1954)).
67. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
68. Id. at 656-61, 771 P.2d at 821-25, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872-76.
69. Id. at 664, 771 P.2d at 827, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
70. Id. at 647, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
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ments of proximity and contemporaneous awareness of the acci-
dent.7' She only satisfied the close relationship prong of the Dillon
test.7' She had learned of the accident from her daughter after John
had been hit by a car and found him in the road, unconscious and
bloody.73 She thought John had died.74 The mother alleged that
she suffered "great emotional disturbance, shock, and injury to her
nervous system."75
The California Supreme Court denied recovery.7 6  The court
imposed a very strict reading of Dillon's sensory awareness prong.
77
Because Mrs. Thing had been in the house at the time of the accident,
she failed that requirement and could not recover.78
In Thing, the court did more than merely decide that Mrs. Thing
could not collect NIED damages because she had not observed the
accident to her son. It also stated in dicta that only people "closely
related by blood or marriage" to a victim could recover for NIED.79
The Thing decision provoked two stinging dissents by Justices
Mosk" and Broussard,"' and a highly critical concurrence by Justice
Kaufman.' Justice Kaufman stated that neither the dissent's desire
to keep the more liberal standard in Dillon nor the majority's opinion
had "articulated a genuinely 'principled' rule of law."' 3
71. Id. at 648, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
72. IL at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
73. Id. at 647-48, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
74. l at 647, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
75. Il at 648, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
76. IaL at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
77. Ia
78. Id.
79. Id. at 666, 771 P.2d at 828, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879. Close relatives by blood or
marriage were more likely to suffer a severe degree of emotional distress than a
"disinterested witness." Id.
80. Id. at 677, 771 P.2d at 836, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority misperceived the authorities it cited).
81. Id. at 682,771 P.2d at 839,257 Cal. Rptr. at 890 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Justice
Broussard argued that a flexible Dillon test is a "principled basis for determining [NIED]
liability." 1d. at 689, 771 P.2d at 844, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 895 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881 (Kaufman, J., concurring)
("[H]istory and experience have shown ... that the quest for sensible and just limits on
bystander liability is 'an inherently fruitless one.' " Id. at 676, 771 P.2d at 835, 257 Cal.
Rptr. at 886 (Kaufman, J., concurring) (quoting Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.,
59 Cal. 2d 295, 313, 379 P.2d 513, 524, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44 (1963), overruled by Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)).
83. Id at 670,771 P.2d at 831,257 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (Kaufman, J., concurring). Justice
Kaufman proposed a return of the zone of danger test. AL at 676, 771 P.2d at 835, 257
Cal. Rptr. at 886.
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In this Comment, I argue that one of the problems with a flexible
"test of reasonable foreseeability"' is that such a test may make a
court willing to adopt a rigid test to avoid imposing limitless liability
on defendants.85 I propose a test that will provide the flexibility of
foreseeability while avoiding the pitfall of causing a fear of limitless
liability.
IV. ANALYSIS
Dillon and Thing have generated criticism from scholars86 and
courts alike. 7 I will try to find a middle ground between the amor-
84. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 191, 703 P.2d 1, 23, 216 Cal. Rptr.
661, 683 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) ("Dillon and Molien compel the conclusion that
reasonable foreseeability is the appropriate test for determining whether a defendant is
liable for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.").
85. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 656, 771 P.2d at 821, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872. "Little
consideration has been given in post-Dillon decisions to the importance of avoiding the
limitless exposure to liability that the pure foreseeability test of 'duty' would create and
towards which these decisions have moved." Id. For example, they justified limiting
recovery to plaintiffs closely related to the victim "by blood or marriage" even though
"[s]uch limitations are indisputably arbitrary since it is foreseeable that in some cases
unrelated persons have a relationship to the victim or are so affected.., that they suffer
equivalent emotional distress." Id. at 666, 771 P.2d at 828, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
86. See, e.g., Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic
Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 336-40 (1984) (arguing that restrictions on Dillon test cost
society more in the long run by not adequately redressing people's harms); John L.
Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders
and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (1984) (criticizing amorphous
nature of Dillon guidelines and suggesting that foreseeability is an inadequate mechanism
for measuring damages); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1982);
Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A
Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477,516 (1982) (criticizing
rigid duty requirements for NIED); Timothy M. Cavanaugh, Comment, A New Tort in
California: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (For Married Couples Only), 41
HASTINGS LJ. 447 (1990) (criticizing California Supreme Court's decision in Elden v.
Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988), restricting recovery only
to people related by blood or marriage); Michael A. Sitzman, Note, Marlene F. v.
Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc.: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Bounces Out of Bounds, 22 PAC. L.J. 189, 219 (1990) ("After Marlene F, the likelihood
that the direct victim theory... will be read narrowly is remote.").
87. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 670, 771 P.2d at 831, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring) ("[E]xperience has shown that rigid doctrinal limitations on bystander liability
result inevitably in disparate treatment of plaintiffs in substantially the same position
.... On the other hand, two decades of adjudication under... Dillon... has... created
a body of case law marked by even greater confusion and inconsistency of result."); id. at
685,771 P.2d at 841,257 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (Broussard, J., dissenting) ("The majority's strict
requirement does not simply comprise a 'bright line' rule that rationally limits liability" but
imposes a rule that "is arbitrary and will lead to unjust results."). The New Jersey
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phous Dillon test and the rigid Thing requirements.
A. A New Test
This Comment proposes a three-step analysis." In order to
recover for NIED as a non-physically-injured third party, a plaintiff
would need to show all of the following: (1) the victim suffered a
traumatic physical injury as a result of the defendant's negligence; (2)
the plaintiff suffered Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a
result of the victim's traumatic injury; and (3) the plaintiff had a close,
affectionate, and enduring relationship (CAER) with the victim that
was damaged as a result of the defendant's negligence.
1. Victim's injuries must be either fatal, severe,
extremely painful, or permanent89
To allow a plaintiff to collect third-party NIED damages under
the proposed test, the effect of the victim's injury would need to fall
into any one of the following categories: the victim dies; the victim
suffers permanent disfigurement; the victim suffers permanent
physical or mental crippling; or the victim endures a long recovery
period. The injuries required as a threshold in the proposed test
would cause death or suffering so terrible that those close to the
victim may suffer PTSD as a result.9
a. the victim dies
The injury causes the death of the victim. The victim's death can
be immediate, or after a long period in which the injury precedes
death.91
The plaintiff's psychic suffering could likely be worse if the victim
died after a long period of suffering from severe bums than if the
Supreme Court noted that "we are unpersuaded by the concerns of the California court
expressed in Elden and Thing that without a 'bright line' definition of the bystander-victim
relationship, courts will not be able to counteract fraudulent and meretricious claims."
Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 378 (N.J. 1994).
88. Hereinafter called the "proposed test."
89. Many of the cases cited in this section are not cases cited for NIED holdings. In
many cases NIED was not even pleaded. Rather, they are cases in which courts took
notice of the devastating effects of the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs who would be
"victims" in our NIED scenario. Thus, the cases are not cited for their holdings but for
their fact patterns.
90. See infra part IV.A.2.
91. See infra part IV.A.l.b-d.
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victim died quickly from blood loss from an automobile accident.
This category also includes terminal radiation poisoning,9 termina-
tion of an otherwise normal pregnancy,93 or the death of a fetus from
negligent prenatal care resulting in stillbirth.94
b. the victim suffers permanent disfigurement
Permanent damage to a person's physical appearance is often an
extremely traumatic form of injury for a victim and can cause extreme
emotional pain. A victim can lose self-confidence if the disfigurement
is severe enough.9  Sometimes the disfigured person's friends
decrease in number because "it is real hard [for the victim] to be out
in the world. 96 Disfigured people can suffer severe depression as
a result of their injuries. 9 Additionally, disfigured people can suffer
a sharp loss of earning capacity.
9 8
92. Golstein v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1415, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1990)
(observing that child died from accidental overdose of radiation intended as cancer
therapy). In Golstein, the court denied the parents' NIED claim because the parents did
not "perceive the event." Id at 1427, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
93. See, e.g., Henderson v. North, 545 So. 2d 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (noting
that plaintiff mother may have miscarried as a result of a negligent biopsy).
94. E.g., Kahn v. Hip Hosp., 487 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (allowing mother to
recover under "zone of danger" rule); Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt.
1980) (allowing possible NIED damages for mother).
However, the following cases expressly held that fathers could not recover. Justice
v. Booth Maternity Ctr., 498 A.2d 950, 953 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Vaillancourt, 425 A.2d
at 95 (finding husband not within zone of danger). The proposed test would permit the
father to recover along with the mother since both parents and the fetus would have a
familial relationship. See infra part IV.A.3.
95. Wry v. Dial, 503 P.2d 979, 987 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (observing that burn victim
"wishe[d] his face was not visible" to other people).
96. See Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 840 P.2d 860, 877 (Wash. 1992); see also Wry,
503 P.2d at 986 (observing burn victim was "being pointed, stared and laughed at by
children and adults"); Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 559 F.2d 468, 471 (8th Cir. 1977)
("Hysell has suffered serious mental distress, including a reluctance to go out in public.
97. Washburn, 840 P.2d at 877 (noting that clinical psychologist who examined burn
victim testified that the victim's appearance may have resulted in a "pretty powerful
reactive depression"); Faulk v. Power Rig Drilling Co., 348 So. 2d 219,222 (La. Ct. App.
1977) (finding man who suffered crushed skull was extremely depressed because of severe
scarring).
98. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596, 601 (1919) ("[A] serious
disfigurement of the face or head reasonably may be regarded as having a direct relation
to the injured person's earning power... ."); Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 403 N.E.2d
402, 405 (Mass. 1980) (upholding opinion of trial judge who observed, "it is susceptible of
common knowledge that with [her] massive scars [the victim's] future opportunities for
employment are going to be impaired"); Dietrick v. Kemper Ins. Co., 556 N.E.2d 1108,
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Injuries that can cause permanent disfigurement include but are
not limited to severe burns99 and severe head injuries."°
c. the victim suffers permanent physical crippling
Permanent physical injuries can render a person unable to
work,"' enjoy activities the victim once enjoyed,"° or live inde-
pendently." Some victims suffer partial 4" or total loss of their
ability to speak. 5 Bedridden victims can require special care for
bladder and lung infections'06 and "pressure sores."' 7 Permanent-
1110 (N.Y. 1990) (finding that facial disfigurement has a tendency to impair earning
capacity of victims); Matthews v. Falvey Linen Supply, 294 A.2d 398, 402 (R.I. 1972)
(holding that burn on victim's arm reduced earning capacity).
99. Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1978); Wry, 503 P.2d
at 985; Washburn, 840 P.2d at 877.
100. Faulk, 348 So. 2d at 222.
101. See, e.g., Davis v. FMC Corp., 771 F.2d 224, 226 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that a
woman whose hand was mangled in a corn cutter was "denied employment, prevented
from being promoted in employment, and threatened with termination, because of her
severely limited dexterity"); Johnson v. H.K. Webster, Inc., 775 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1985)
(awarding foot amputee $300,000 for lost future wages); Higley v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 685
S.W.2d 572, 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (noting 40-year-old man became virtually
unemployable after his limb was crushed in a train coupler because his "education[al] and
mental abilities.., suited [him] only for mechanical... work" which he could no longer
do); Cavanaugh v. Morris, 640 A.2d 1192, 1194 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (finding
young woman unable to work as a waitress because of soft tissue injuries); Grammer v.
Kohlhaas Tank & Equip. Co., 604 P.2d 823, 833 (N.M. Ct, App. 1979) (finding skull
fracture victim unable to work for remainder of life), cert denied, 614 P.2d 545 (N.M.
1980).
102. See, e.g., Flanigan v. Burlington N., Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 885 (8th Cir. 1980)
("[Amputee] can no longer garden, swim, hunt, dance or do maintenance work on his
house."); Wry, 503 P.2d at 982, 986-87 (finding burn victim unable to be creative or
athletic); Grammer, 604 P.2d at 833 (observing that skull fracture victim's former
recreational, family, and social pleasures were lost for the remainder of his life).
103. McCoy v. Wean United, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 495, 499 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (finding 20-
year-old female college student who lost her right hand and left finger in a punch press
had difficulty doing work in her home and dressing herself); Rodriguez v. McDonnell-
Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 654, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399, 414 (1978) (finding triplegic
unable to care for self).
104. E.g., Morrow v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 541 F.2d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting
that victim's speech was limited and monotone due to brain damage).
105. E.g., Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230,237,116 Cal. Rptr. 733,736
(1974) (noting that injured child was rendered mute); Williams v. State Highway Dept., 205
N.W.2d 200, 205 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that victim was "unable to talk in any
fashion").
106. E.g., Talcott v. Holl, 224 So. 2d 420, 424 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (finding that
victim would need constant nursing attention for maintenance of lung, bladder, and skin
condition), cert. denied, 232 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1969).
107. E.g., Rodriguez, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 653-54, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (observing that
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ly crippling injuries include, but are not limited to, severe bums,"°s
amputation of limbs,"° partial or total blindness,' partial deaf-
ness,"' partial or total paralysis,"2 and brain damage."3
Permanently crippling injuries can directly affect other people
close to the victim, especially when victims' conditions require that
someone else care for them. Crippled victims often need wheel-
chairs,"' prosthetic devices,"5 lifelong special medication,"6 or
modified vehicles."7 Severely crippled victims may require constant
care at home or in a nursing facility."' Providing special care can
pressure sores can penetrate to bone, leading to osteomyelitis and eventual amputation of
the victim's legs).
108. E.g., Wry, 503 P.2d at 985 (noting that burn victim will suffer for the rest of his life
as a result of the injury); Washburn, 840 P.2d at 876 (noting that attending physician
described victim's injuries as "[b]eing burned is forever").
109. E.g., Flanigan, 632 F.2d at 885 (noting that since the amputation of his left leg,
victim can no longer garden, swim, hunt, dance, or do maintenance work on his house).
110. E.g., Reilly v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 976,983 (D.R.I. 1987) (noting that child
blinded at birth because of doctor's negligence will "never be able to walk, talk, feed
herself, or take care of herself in any way").
111. E.g., Grammer, 604 P.2d at 832 ("[Victim] ... suffered a moderately severe
neurosensory type hearing loss in both ears as a result of damages to the inner organ of
the ears ... ."). The victim in Granmer suffered a skull fracture when a compressor tank
exploded. Id.
112. E.g., Brinegar v. San Ore Constr. Co., 302 F. Supp. 630, 643 (E.D. Ark. 1969);
Rodriguez, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 654, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 414; Talcott, 224 So. 2d at 422;
Williams, 205 N.W.2d at 205 (noting 16-year-old girl suffered "partial paralysis of all four
extremities and the trunk"); Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp., 686 P.2d 925, 931 (Nev.
1984) (noting auto accident made woman paraplegic).
113. E.g., Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 395 (D.R.I. 1975); Wry, 503 P.2d
at 986; Faulk, 348 So. 2d at 222; Deville v. Budd Constr. Co., 617 So. 2d 570, 577 (La. Ct.
App. 1993).
114. E.g., Brinegar, 302 F. Supp. at 643 (noting quadriplegic accident victim "must lie
face down on surfboard type" wheelchair); Stackiewicz, 686 P.2d at 932 (noting paraplegic
could not move without wheelchair).
115. E.g., Yassin v. Certified Grocers, 502 N.E.2d 315, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(observing that young child who had hand mangled by a meat tenderizer would need 16
prostheses over her lifetime).
116. See, e.g., Reilly, 665 F. Supp. at 983 (observing injured child would require $105,837
worth of medication, lab tests, and special products); Niles, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 241-42, 116
Cal. Rptr. at 739-40 (observing quadriplegic 11-year-old boy would incur $196,902 worth
of future medical expenses).
117. See, e.g., Reilly, 665 F. Supp. at 983 (noting modified van for quadriplegic cost over
approximately $115,000 plus approximately $68,000 in operating costs).
118. E.g., Hysell, 559 F.2d at 471 ("Someone must be constantly in attendance to care
for [the victim's] needs."); Caron, 410 F. Supp. at 394 (noting that injured child will require
"protective care in a pediatric nursing home the remainder of her life"); Williams, 205
N.W.2d at 205 (victim of brain stem injury was unable to function "within her family
structure" and was subsequently sent to state psychiatric hospital); Deville, 617 So. 2d at
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cost a great deal of money. 9 and strain marriages, friendships, and
other relationships." Sometimes people close to a victim may
require counseling when the stress is too much to bear.
12 1
d. the victim must endure a long recovery period
During a long recovery period, victims are often unable to
work' or continue their educationaz and often incur high medical
bills2 4 or require day-to-day care until recovery."z  Often, the
monetary burden of this care falls onto loved ones who must pay,
provide services, or both." Injuries requiring this type of care
could include moderate bums, multiple fractures, compound fractures,
temporary coma, and very large cuts.
Under the proposed test, a long recovery period means that the
victim would have to be cared for by the plaintiff and the plaintiff
would have to lose something as a result of having to provide that
care. There is no time limit requirement. If a victim suffers an injury
that takes six months to heal but is able to continue working or
577 (victim with brain stem injury needed structured, supervised care in nursing facility).
119. See, e.g., Hysell, 559 F.2d at 474 (awarding of $578,295 for future nursing care for
triple amputee was not excessive); Niles, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 242, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 740
(noting lifetime nursing care costs for blinded, paralyzed child exceed $1 million).
120. See, e.g., Robbins v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 634, 638 (E.D. Mo. 1984)
(observing biologist husband required to sharply reduce work week to care for wife who
suffered crushed legs), aff'd without op., 767 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1985); Brinegar, 302 F.
Supp. at 644 (observing that role of quadriplegic accident victim's wife changed from
"loving companion" to "lonely nurse"); Deville, 617 So. 2d at 577 (observing parents
unable to care for burned, brain-damaged young man).
121. E.g., Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 359-60 (3d Cir. 1992),
rev'd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2408 (1994) (observing that man who witnessed
friend's death and was forced to view the uncovered body for several hours required
hospitalization).
122. E.g., Burnsed v. State Bd. of Control, 189 Cal. App. 3d 213, 215, 234 Cal. Rptr.
316, 317 (1987) (observing that after workplace assault, the victim was unable to work for
23 weeks as a result of injuries); Fletcher v. Dana Corp., 459 S.E.2d 31, 32 (N.C. Ct. App.
1995) (injured worker received workmen's compensation benefits because he was unable
to find employment during recovery period).
123. E.g., Klein v. Himbert, 474 So. 2d 513, 516 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (as a result of
accident, victim "was forced to forego his education for two semesters").
124. E.g., Tucker v. Pinder, 631 So. 2d 735,739 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that woman
suffering crushed leg and fractured sternum incurred $56,013.20 in medical expenses).
125. E.g., Mercer v. Fruehauf Corp., 492 So. 2d 538, 544 (La. Ct. App.), cert denied,
496 So. 2d 350 (La. 1986) (observing accident victim required day-to-day care by spouse
until recovery).
126. E.g., Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel, 12 Cal. 3d 382,386,525 P.2d 669,670,115 Cal.
Rptr. 765, 766 (1974) (noting that victim's spouse gave up her job to take care of him "on
a 24-hour basis").
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attending school, there is far less of a likelihood that people close to
the plaintiff will suffer compensable emotional distress. On the other
hand, a month-long recovery period where the victim requires
constant care, as in a temporary coma, can be much more burden-
some and thus potentially traumatic to the plaintiff
As a general note, whether a particular injury falls into any of the
categories described above can vary according to factors such as the
victim's age or general health. For example, a victim with a broken
leg who is an otherwise healthy young adult will likely heal relatively
quickly and probably not require care that would place an undue
burden on a plaintiff-caregiver. But that same injury in an elderly
person could be quite different; healing might take much longer, and
the victim might require much more extensive care that is a far
greater burden on the plaintiff
2. Plaintiff suffers Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
Once a court determines that a victim's injury falls into any of
the categories described under Part IV.A.1, the court must examine
the severity of the emotional distress suffered by the noninjured third-
party plaintiff."' Using a catalog of discrete symptoms, psychiatrists
can determine that a person is suffering from Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) 28
People have long known that survivors of a traumatic event often
pay a heavy physical and mental price.29 Research showed that
survivors of a catastrophe exhibited a particular, definable series of
symptoms that could be cataloged and examined.Y The American
Psychiatric Association (APA) included this set of criteria for
127. If the victim does not die, suffer permanent physical or mental crippling, or endure
a long recovery period, it is not reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff will suffer severe
emotional distress and thus the plaintiff should not recover. See supra part IV.A.3.
128. Charles R. Figley, Traumatic Stress: The Role of the Family and Social Support
System, in 2 TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE: TRAUMATIC STRESS THEORY, RESEARCH AND
INTERVENTION 39,41 (Charles R. Figley ed., 1986) [hereinafter Figley]. At least one court
requires "the use of medical and psychiatric evidence" to determine whether a plaintiff in
an NIED case suffered compensably severe emotional distress. Heldreth v. Mans, 425
S.E.2d 157, 167 (W. Va. 1992).
129. See MICHAEL J. SCOTT & STEPHEN G. STRADLING, COUNSELLING FOR POST-
TRAUmATIC STRESS DISORDER 1-2 (1992) (observing that both Homer and Shakespeare
accurately depicted people suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)).
130. See id. at 2. Studies of flood, fire, and concentration camp survivors revealed that
victims suffered traumatic stress symptoms very similar to those suffered by soldiers
returning from World Wars I and II. Id.
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diagnosing PTSD into their standard guide for diagnosis and
treatment of mental disorders.131 While not mathematically precise,
these criteria provide an objective and rational way to determine the
severity of a person's psychic injury.13 2
A person diagnosed with PTSD has experienced or witnessed an
event which involved actual or threatened death or severe physical
injury and reacted with "intense fear, helplessness or horror." '133
Afterwards, the person persistently reexperiences the traumatic event,
avoids stimuli associated with the event; and suffers "increased
arousal" because of the event.I34 These symptoms of PTSD continue
for more than a month and cause "clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of
functioning.'
135
131. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL (DSM-
IV) 427-29 (1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
132. See id, at xxi ("[N]o definition adequately specifies precise boundaries for the
concept of 'mental disorder.' ").
133. Id. at 427-28. Another author observed "we may be perfectly safe ourselves, yet
still be traumatized when a loved one is in danger." Figley, supra note 128, at 42.
134. DSM-IV, supra note 129, at 428. In psychology, "arousal" is "a measure of
responsiveness or activity in organisms." ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY
18 (Terry Pettijohn et al. eds., 3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter PSYCHOLOGY]. Degrees of arousal
can range from coma at the low end to intense excitement at the high end. Id. For
symptoms of increased arousal, see infra note 135.
135. DSM-IV, supra note 131, at 429. The full text of the PTSD criteria are as follows:
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the
following were present:
(1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or
events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat
to the physical integrity of self or others
(2) the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror...
B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or more) of the
following ways:
(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including
images, thoughts, or perceptions....
(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event....
(3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a
sense of reliving the. experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative
flashback episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when
intoxicated)....
(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues
that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
(5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that
symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of
general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or
more) of the following:
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the
trauma
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The exact mechanism that causes psychic trauma has been
debated by psychiatrists for over 100 years. 6 But the general
manifestations that support a diagnosis of PTSD have been well
documented. 37 Traumatic events share a number of elements that
allow them to be readily identified.'38 First, they are sudden and
allow no warning or time to devise a plan of escape.'39 Second, the
event is dangerous for the trauma victim or someone close to that
person."4  Finally, the traumatic event is so overwhelming that it
induces "a sense of temporary helplessness," which may cause a
person to panic and behave in a way that is "inconsistent with his or
her self-concept.'
14'
People close to a victim who had the good luck to be spared
injury can suffer from "survivor guilt."' 42  Thus, people close to a
(2) efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of
the trauma
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma
(4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
(6) restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings)
(7) sense of a foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career,
marriage, children, or a normal life span)
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma),
as indicated by two (or more) of the following:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger
(3) difficulty concentrating
(4) hypervigilance
(5) exaggerated startle response
E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D) is more than
I month.
F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
Id. at 427-29 (emphasis added).
136. See RICHARD B. ULMAN & DORIS BROTHERS, THE SHATTERED SELF: A
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF TRAUMA 1-2 (1988). Ulman and Brothers argue that trauma
is the result of real-world catastrophe ranging from sexual assault to atomic bomb blasts.
Id. at 2. They seek to refute the "false impression within psychoanalysis" that the
disruption of the trauma victim's "world of private fantasy" is more important than terrible
real-world events. Id.
137. See id. at 2-6.
138. Figley, supra note 128, at 40-42.
139. Id. at 41.
140. Id. at 41-42.
141. Id. at 42. "Self-concept" is a "person's mental picture of himself or herself."
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 134, at 251.
142. Tom Williams, Diagnosis and Treatment of Survivor Guilt: The Bad Penny
Syndrome, in HUMAN ADAPTATION TO EXTREME STRESS: FROM THE HOLOCAUST TO
VIETNAM 319,319-20 (John P. Wilson et al. eds., 1988). The assistance of people close to
the victim of a physical injury is seen as vital to that person's psychic recovery. Figley,
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victim of traumatic physical injury may be victims themselves and may
require care and concern by the community at large.
As well documented as traumatic psychological injury is, there
remains a persistent fear of malingering, especially in lawsuits."
But symptoms of PTSD show up with great regularity in disaster
survivors.'" It is unreasonable to assume that malingering is a
problem in the majority of these cases. Personal tragedies do not
usually make the news like great disasters such as those at Three Mile
Island 45 and Bhopal."4 Nevertheless a personal tragedy is still a
disaster for the people affected by it, and they will suffer emotional
trauma as a result.
Courts often ask whether or not a person claiming NIED
underwent psychotherapy. 47 But the exercise of seeking treatment
could be limited by a person's income. Psychiatrists use a variety of
initial indicators of mental disturbance including "suicidal ideation,
severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting, [or] any serious
impairment in social, occupational or school functions to determine
supra note 128, at 40. The key to that success is the empathy that people close to a victim
can feel for the victim's sufferings. ld. at 48. But empathy also makes people close to a
victim "vulnerable to the consequences of their assistance by the very mechanism that
makes them so effective." Id.
143. See DSM-IV, supra note 131, at 683.
Malingering should be strongly suspected if any combination of the following is
noted:
1. Medicolegal context of presentation (e.g., the person is referred by an
attorney to the clinician for examination)
2. Marked discrepancy between the person's claimed stress or disability
and the objective findings
3. Lack of cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and in complying
with the prescribed treatment regimen
4. The presence of Antisocial Personality Disorder
Id.
144. DSM-IV, supra note 131, at 424; SCoTw & STRADLING, supra note 129, at 2.
145. In re Three Mile Island Litigation, 87 F.R.D. 433,434 (M.D. Pa. 1980). On March
28, 1979, a nuclear reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in the Susquehanna
River near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, released radioactive material into the atmosphere
that contaminated the area within 25 miles of the plant. Id.
146. E.g., Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: "Dead Zones" and Toxic Death Risk
Index Taxes, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 761 (1992). On December 5, 1984, a leak of deadly
poisonous gas killed more than 2,000 people and injured more than 200,000 others living
in the shantytowns of Bhopal, India. L, at 761.
147. See, eg., Fred W. Alvarez & Elena E. Matsis, Reductions in Workforce: Legal
Rights and Remedies in Downsizing, 206 ALI-ABA 87, 101 (1991) (observing that if a
worker sought psychotherapy after being fired, courts were likely to consider the
emotional distress severe).
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
if a person has suffered from a serious mental disturbance."'"
Some possible indicia of PTSD might include the inability to hold a
job and the avoidance of friends or family.49 PTSD could also
manifest itself through nightmares, insomnia, and loss of appetite.'50
People with PTSD could suffer from specific fears related to the
traumatic incident, have "difficulty concentrating,"'l 2 or experi-
ence deterioration of interpersonal relationships.5
Under the proposed test plaintiffs can introduce evidence that
they are suffering from PTSD,'s and defendants can rebut with
evidence to show that the plaintiff's mental disturbance existed before
the traumatic event.'55
3. Plaintiff had a close, affectionate, and
enduring relationship with victim
The proposed test examines the value of relationships among the
people involved in an NIED case. 6 It values family relationships
more highly than nonfamily relationships. This difference is due to
the central role the family holds in our society and culture. The
proposed test also allows for orderly examination of "nontraditional"
and nonfamily relationships and their value to the plaintiff' 57
A plaintiff who shows that the victim has suffered a severe or
fatal injury and who demonstrates severe psychic trauma also needs
to show that he or she had a close, affectionate, and enduring
148. DSM-IV, supra note 131, at 32. The "Global Assessment of Functioning" (GAF)
scale is often used as a way to track a person's current level of functioning to determine
the need for treatment or care. Id. at 30.
149. See id. at 32.
150. IL at 428.
151. Id. In Eyrich v. Dam, 473 A.2d 539 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1984), the plaintiff suffered
a fear that he "would be attacked by a cat or other animal" after he attempted to rescue
a young child from an attack by a circus leopard. Id. at 543.
152. DSM-IV, supra note 131, at 425.
153. See id A person with PTSD could suffer a "feeling of detachment or estrange-
ment from others," "restricted range of affect," or "irritability or outbursts of anger" which
were "not present before the trauma." Id. at 428. If such episodes continued for a long
enough time, they could damage relationships between victims and plaintiffs.
154. Evidence could include expert medical testimony. Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d
759,767 (Ohio 1983) (citing Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 1983)).
Lay witnesses, well-acquainted with the plaintiff, could testify as to changes in plaintiff's
habits or outlook. Id
155. A defendant could show, for example, that the plaintiff was irritable, angry, or
unable to have loving feelings before the traumatic event.
156. See infra part IV.A.3.
157. See infra part IV.A.3.c.
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relationship (CAER) with the victim. The relationship must meet all
three criteria to be a CAER under the proposed test.
The dictionary defines "close" as "bound by mutual interests,
loyalties, or affections; intimate."'' 8 The dictionary defines "affec-
tionate" as "having or sharing fond feelings or affections; loving and
tender."1"9 The dictionary defines "enduring" as "lasting; continu-
ing; durable."' 6
Some relationships will not fit all categories. For example, a
relationship can be close and enduring but not affectionate, as with
divorced spouses who share visitation rights with respect to their
children, yet who also hate each other. On the other hand, relation-
ships can be close and affectionate but not enduring. For example,
two people may meet in a bar and become friends but never contact
each other when one moves away.
a. presumption with family relationship
Under the proposed test, family relationships are presumed to be
CAERs because families serve a central role in inculcating people's
values.161 Also, family relationships have always enjoyed a special
deference under the law. 2
Under the proposed test, families include spouses, children
(natural or adopted), siblings, and parents." Under the proposed
test, families can also extend beyond the so-called nuclear family to
include cousins, aunts, uncles, grandparents, adoptees, step-siblings,
and step-parents. 64
158. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 459 (3d ed. 1992).
159. Id at 29.
160. Id. at 609.
161. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503-04 (1977) (observing that families
act to inculcate "cherished values, moral and cultural").
162. Another definition of familial relationships is people "tak[ing] primary responsibili-
ty for caring for one another" including, but not limited to, blood relatives. Bender, supra
note 17, at 873 n.66; see also infra note 222.
163. At least one court has found that a fetus was a family member for NIED purposes.
Kahn, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 706 (quoting Vaillancourt, 425 A.2d at 95).
164. Rigid insistence on recovery limited to nuclear family members would not be
consistent with customs in some cultures in Hawaii. See Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758,
766 (Haw. 1974) ("It is not uncommon in Hawaii to find several parent-children family
units, with members of three or even four generations, living under one roof as a single
family."). Also, "the custom of giving children to grandparents, near relatives, and friends
to raise whether legally or informally remains a strong one." Id.
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b. presumption rebuttable by preponderance of evidence
Not all family relationships are CAERs. Family members may
be widely separated, unknown to each other, or simply hate one
another. A defendant faced with NIED damages to a third party
plaintiff should have the opportunity to show that the relationship is
not worthy of grief.
For example, siblings may have hated one another for many
years, and suddenly, one dies in an accident that is witnessed by the
other. The defendant to the surviving sibling's NEED claim should be
able to rebut the presumption by producing evidence that the siblings
did not have a CAER.
c. non-family CAER provable by preponderance of evidence
Although family relationships are important,'6 the law has also
recognized the value of other relationships." However, such
relationships could lack the objective long-term indicia of commitment
that marriages have. Nevertheless, at least one progressive court was
willing to examine nonmarital relationships in their totality in another
context.' 67
Under the proposed test, a plaintiff claiming a CAER as the
unmarried cohabitant of the victim could offer evidence to show a
CAER by evidence of their intent to marry, such as a public
engagement notice; testimony that they held themselves out as
spouses; or attempts to marry. 6' Other evidence could include
165. See infra note 222, and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 277, 758 P.2d 582, 588, 250 Cal. Rptr.
254, 260 (1988) (acknowledging that from 1960 to 1970, "cohabitation without marriage"
increased 800% and that "some of these couples are bound by emotional ties as strong as
those that bind formally married partners"). From 1970 to 1980, the number of unmarried
cohabitants nearly tripled again. Id at 273 n.3, 758 P.2d at 585-86 n.3, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
257-58 n.3.
167. E.g., Zimmerman v. Burton, 434 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (Civ. Ct. 1980) (holding
unmarried cohabitant of deceased tenant had right to continue living in the unit under
rent-control laws).
168. Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 646, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814, 826-27 (1985),
overruled on other grounds by Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 254 (1988). In Ledger, the young couple tried to marry twice before the would-be
husband was stabbed to death-in front of the would-be wife-during a roadside fracas.
Id. at 630-31, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 816. This analysis would also apply to same-sex couples
who either tried to marry but were legally forbidden from doing so or had a nonlegal
"marriage" in a church without a marriage license. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993) (denying same-sex couple the ability to legally marry). Under the proposed test, one
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shared checking or savings accounts,169 estate plans that provided for
each other, or even mutually beneficial life insurance policies. 7 '
Under the proposed test CAERs can also include quasi-parental
relationships such as a child and the child's caretaker 7' or a friend-
ship that has lasted for many years.172
A defendant faced with liability could offer evidence showing, for
example, that a purportedly affianced couple had a falling out.
Evidence may include the return of engagement rings, statements
publicly declaring that "the wedding is off;" or one person's marriage
to a third party before the tort.
Without a family relationship, plaintiff and victim will not have
a presumption of CAER in their favor but neither will they have any
presumptions against them. They will, therefore, need to adduce
some evidence; plaintiffs who fail to bring any evidence that would
tend to prove that they had CAERs with the victims should not have
a cause of action for NIED.
The proposed test examines the relationship between a plaintiff
and a victim in a way that considers the way the people involved view
the relationship. Familial relationships will have a presumption in
their favor of being valued, but the proposed test recognizes that not
all family relationships are CAERs. A defendant should not have to
pay for a plaintiff's emotional distress if the defendant can show that
the plaintiff did not suffer PTSD as a result of the victim's injury.
The lack of a familial relationship with the victim will not be fatal to
a plaintiff's case, however.
B. Damages
Severe psychic trauma can aggravate a plaintiff's other problems
and thus justify an increase in damages. If a victim requires a great
of the partners in Baehr could have a claim for NIED if the other suffered a fatal,
disfiguring, or crippling injury; their attempt to get a marriage license and the lawsuit both
could serve as evidence of their CAER.
169. E.g., Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 373 (N.J. 1994).
170. E.g., id.
171. See Eyrich, 473 A.2d at 547 ("In our view when a person who has been entrusted
with the temporary care of a child witnesses the child's accidental death or critical injury
and knows he cannot return the child safely to his parents, his remorse, no matter how
blameless he may have been, necessarily imposes an excruciating and wrenching burden
of guilt.").
172. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2415 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting that under the bystander test one who knew the decedent for 15 years
may have recovered even though there is no blood or marital relation).
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deal of care, providing that care can severely strain a caregiver's
resources." Some factors that may suggest augmented damages are
the plaintiff's long period of care before a victim's death, a family's
financial situation made precarious by medical expenses, or a
significant loss of income caused by a caregiver's time away from
work.'74 In severe cases, caregivers could lose their jobs, their good
credit ratings, or their homes.
These factors could aggravate already severe PTSD and justify an
augmented award of damages.
C. Unlike Old Formulas, a New NIED Test for Third-Party
Plaintiffs Will Effectively Balance Competing Policy Concerns and
Provide an Effective Analytical Framework
NIED has generated a great deal of commentary 7 6 but only a
few scholars propose any analyses of their own.' One student-
173. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
174. If a victim is crippled severely enough, a person close to the victim, such as a
spouse, may have almost a full-time job caring for the victim. In Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974), the California
Supreme Court described the burdens a wife endured in caring for her triplegic husband:
Each night she must wake in order to turn him from side to side, so as to
minimize the occurrence of bedsores. Every morning and evening she must help
him wash, dress and undress, and get into and out of his wheelchair ....
Because he has lost all bladder and bowel control, she must assist him in the
difficult and time-consuming processes of performing those bodily functions by
artificial inducement. Many of these activities require her to lift or support his
body weight, thus placing a repeated physical strain on her.
Id. at 386, 525 P.2d at 670-71, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 766-67; see also sources cited supra note
120.
Crippled victims may suffer a loss of sexual functions. See Stackiewicz v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 686 P.2d 925, 932 (Nev. 1984) (observing paraplegic woman suffered total
loss of sexual function); Cavanaugh v. Morris, 640 A.2d 1192, 1194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1994) (noting woman suffering soft tissue injuries suffered severely reduced sex life).
This could strain an existing marriage or make a person who had been contemplating
marriage to the victim have a change of heart.
175. For example, plaintiffs suffering PTSD could experience "irritability or outbursts
of anger," alienate themselves from coworkers or supervisors and thus lose their jobs.
DSM-IV, supra note 131, at 428. Loss of a job could lead to loss of credit or a home.
176. E.g., Richard S. Miller, The Scope of Liability of Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAW. L. REV. 1 (1979); Thomas
C. Zaret, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Reconciling the Bystander
and Direct Victim Causes of Action, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 145 (1983); see also sources cited
supra note 86.
177. However, there are exceptions. See Julie A. Greenberg, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: A Proposal for a Consistent Theory of Tort Recovery for Bystanders
and Direct Victims, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1283, 1310 (1992). Greenberg proposes that (1) the
plaintiff or an injury victim closely related to the plaintiff must have a preexisting
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written comment proposed "objective criteria" to determine the
nature of the relationships and injuries to victims and plaintiffs.'78
This commentator, John David Burley, proposed a rule that synthe-
sized all of the concerns into one formula.'79 Burley's test first
requires the court to determine whether the relationship between the
victim and the plaintiff "contain[s] the essence of familial or spousal
ties."' ° The jury would determine whether the defendant's conduct
caused "severe bodily harm or death to the victim;" whether plaintiff
observed the harm; whether plaintiff appreciated the severity of the
harm; whether plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and
whether "the observance of the victim's condition [was] a substantial
factor in causing the plaintiff's emotional distress."'8 1
Burley's test is a step in the right direction because it begins to
deal with the complexity of NIED situations. Like the proposed test,
Burley's test examines the relationship between victim and plaintiff
and requires a physical injury to the victim in addition to severe
emotional distress for the plaintiff But Burley's test suffers from
defects that the proposed test will attempt to remedy.
relationship with the defendant; (2) one of the primary purposes of the ... relationship
must be to protect the plaintiff's emotional tranquility; and (3) as a result of defendant's
tortious conduct, the plaintiff must suffer severe emotional distress. let Other authors are
Pearson, supra note 86, at 516 (arguing for zone of danger rule); and Zaret, supra note
176, at 168-69 (proposing jury instructions describing direct victim and bystander cases with
appropriate definitions).
178. John D. Burley, Comment, Dillon Revisited: Toward a Better Paradigm for
Bystander Cases, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 931, 948-49 (1982). The rule outlined in Burley's
comment will hereinafter be called "Burley's test."
179. Id.
180. Id
181. Id The complete text of Burley's test follows:
(1) Question of law: Does the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim
contain the essence of familial or spousal ties?
(2) Question of fact:
(a) Did the defendant act negligently to cause severe bodily harm or death
to the victim?
(b) Did the plaintiff observe any of the following:
(i) The development or infliction of serious bodily harm or death;
(ii) serious bodily harm or death after its occurrence but without
material change in condition and location of the victim?
(c) Did the plaintiff appreciate the severity of the victim's condition at the
time of the observance?
(d) Did the plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress?
(e) Was the observance of the victim's condition a substantial factor in
causing the plaintiff's emotional distress?
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One problem is that Burley's test appears to require contempo-
raneous observance and proximity to the scene of the victim's harm.
Most worrisome, however, is that Burley's test does not define in
detail what certain crucial terms mean. For example, what does
"essence of familial or spousal ties" mean in practical terms?
The proposed test focuses on the harm suffered by the plaintiff
and the victim. Requiring, severe- harm to plaintiff and victim
provides a way to ensure the genuineness of NIED claims. Rather
than merely suggesting analytical criteria, the proposed test provides
relatively concrete guideposts for courts to use in determining the
severity of the harm.
1. Contemporaneous observation and close proximity abandoned
The proximity requirement and the closely related contempora-
neous observance requirement have come under well-justified
attack."8  Courts that favor a strict reading of Dillon include the
proximity requirement in their tests,1"' as does Burley."8 Like
those who favor a more open-ended foreseeability standard, 1" the
proposed test abandons proximity and contemporaneous observance
requirements.
Courts have applied both the contemporaneous perception
requirement and the proximity requirement arbitrarily.86 A strict
182. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159,190,703 P2d 1,22-23,216 Cal. Rptr. 661,
682 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "the foreseeability of emotional shock from
seeing a loved one die or suffer injury does not always depend on whether the plaintiff
observes the defendant's conduct or is 'contemporaneously aware' that such conduct is
causing the harm"); Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 532 P.2d 673,678 (Haw. 1975)
(Richardson, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "[c]onfining liability to a specific sphere of
contemporaneity is all too inflexible ... [r]einstat[ing] a scheme of arbitrary distinctions
as to where liability ends").
183. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644,771 P.2d 814,257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989); Rickey
v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983).
184. Burley, supra note 178, at 948:
185. See Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372
(N.J. 1994); Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1983).
186. Some courts apply the requirements relatively strictly. E.g., Fineran v. Pickett, 465
N.W.2d 662, 664 (Iowa 1991) (denying recovery to relatives who arrived two minutes after
fatal bicycle accident to young girl because the relatives did not meet the "sensory and
contemporaneous observance" requirement); Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A2d 279, 284 (Me.
1992) (parents of son badly injured in auto accident who arrived at the hospital two hours
later denied recovery because they did not "actually witness[]" their son's serious injury);
Stockdale v. Bird & Son, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 951, 953-54 (Mass. 1987) (not stating the exact
test but denying recovery to a mother who learned of her 21-year-old son's death from
industrial accident four hours later from police and viewed his body 20 hours later in a
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proximity requirement seems to ignore what happens when a person
suffers PTSD because of a loved one's injury. If the loved one's
injury is severe enough, it would seem that mere temporal separation
from the scene of the injury would not reduce the plaintiff's emotional
suffering. NIED arising from medical malpractice may not be
properly compensated because the plaintiff may not observe the
defendant's conduct.1" A plaintiff's emotional distress resulting
from a message about the injury or death to the victim could possibly
be just as great as if the plaintiff were present at the scene and maybe
as reasonably foreseeable.
Earlier commentators who proposed a relatively open-ended
foreseeability analysis did not have the benefit of hindsight.'88 They
did not observe a California Supreme Court, jittery about "unlimited
liability," harden the Dillon test into an analytical straightjacket.'89
As noted above, the problem is just as much a willingness of courts
to construe an NIED test too rigidly as too broadly.190 The pro-
posed test rejects these analyses.
funeral home); Wilder v. City of Keene, 557 A.2d 636, 637 (N.H. 1989) (denying recovery
to parents who saw their eight-year-old son in a hospital "in extremis" one hour after the
son "collided with an automobile" on his bicycle because they did not meet the
"contemporaneous sensory exception" requirement); Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 787 P.2d
553, 557 (Wash. 1990) ("[M]ental suffering by a relative who is not present at the scene
of the injury-causing event is unforeseeable as a matter of law.").
Other courts are more flexible. E.g., Kelley, 532 P.2d at 676 (The plaintiff must be
"located within a reasonable distance from the scene of the accident."); Lejeune v. Rayne
Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 570 (La. 1990) ("[The plaintiff] must.., either view the
accident or injury-causing event or come upon the accident scene soon thereafter and
before substantial change has occurred in the victim's condition."); Paugh, 451 N.E.2d at
766 ("The closer in proximity a plaintiff is to the accident, the more likely it will be that
the plaintiff's [emotional] injury is foreseeable" and "it is not necessary for a plaintiff to
actually see the accident.").
187. See Golstein v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1415, 1427, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270,
278 (1990) (holding that parents who did not perceive their son's death, caused by
negligent medical care, could not recover for NIED).
188. See, e.g., Nolan & Ursin, supra note 86, at 620 (arguing that "foreseeability and
seriousness ... [e]mployed together ... will adequately limit the class of potential
claims").
189. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 677, 771 P.2d at 836, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) ("[A]lthough the majority do not forthrightly overrule Dillon v. Legg... their
preference is evident.").
190. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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2. Requires a traumatic injury to victim
The Dillon test'9 ' and the pure foreseeability test"9 do not
directly address the severity of the injury suffered by a victim. Some
courts have adopted a requirement that a victim suffer from death or
serious physical injury before a plaintiff-observer can recover for
NIED.9 They reason that minor injuries do not cause the level of
"anguish and disbelief ... that a plaintiff may experience after
witnessing the critical injury to or death of' a loved one.'94
The proposed test includes a serious injury requirement for the
victim. This is the first step in determining, in an objective way, if the
emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff was real.' If a victim
suffers a traumatic injury, it is reasonably foreseeable that persons
with close relationships to the victim will suffer from an emotional
injury arising out of damage to the relationship.'96 Defining the
seriousness of the victim's injury will address concerns of numerous
or frivolous claims."97 It seems more likely that a plaintiff will not
suffer PTSD if the victim suffers only a minor injury.
191. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,740-41,441 P.2d 912,920-21,69 Cal. Rptr. 72,80-81
(1968).
192. Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d at 190-91, 703 P.2d at 23, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 682-83 (Bird, CJ.,
dissenting).
193. E.g., Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822,826-27 (N.M. 1983) ("The accident must
result in physical injury or death to the victim."); Heldreth v. Marrs, 425 S.E.2d 157, 165
(W. Va. 1992) ("[W]e hold that the emotional trauma alleged by a plaintiff must be the
direct result of either the critical injury to or death of a person closely related to the
plaintiff."); Contreras v. Carbon County Sch. Dist., 843 P.2d 589,593 (Wyo. 1992) ("[O]nly
those plaintiffs could recover.. . whose loved one did, in fact, sustain death or 'serious
bodily injury.' ") (citing Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 198-99 (Wyo. 1986)).
194. Heldreth, 425 S.E.2d at 165. This should not be confused with a requirement that
the plaintiff suffer physical injury as a result of the severe emotional distress as required
in a small number of jurisdictions. See Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107-08 (Iowa
1981); Reilly v. United States, 547 A.2d 894, 895 (R.I. 1988).
195. See supra part IV.A.1.
196. See supra part IV.A.1.
197. See Bro v. Glaser, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1398,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894 (1994). The plaintiff
parents sued the defendant surgeon when he nicked their child's face during a caesarian.
Id. at 1400,27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895. The parents alleged that the doctor had caused them
to suffer NIED when he negligently presented the child to them with a bandage on her
face. Id. at 1442, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 923. The court denied recovery because it believed
the case "border[ed] on the frivolous." Id.
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3. Requires a serious psychic injury to plaintiff
Most courts require that the plaintiff suffer an objectively serious
psychic injury to recover for NIED."8
Practitioners can ascertain the severity of a person's psychic
trauma because of developments in psychology and psychiatry.'99
Often, in cases of severe psychic trauma, the plaintiff will have
required "extensive medical treatment and hospitalization."'
But a strict requirement that plaintiffs seek psychotherapy is
unwise. Psychotherapy can be very expensive and health insurance
often does not cover such medical expenses. 1 A therapy require-
ment could have the effect of barring the courthouse door to
deserving plaintiffs who cannot afford to see a psychiatrist.
Therefore, the proposed test only requires that the plaintiff suffer
trauma, not that the plaintiff actually receive treatment. 2m
4. Focus on plaintiff's loss of close relationship to victim
Many courts examine the relationships between plaintiff and
victim in NIED cases.' The strictest Dillon constructionists require
198. See, e.g., Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 570 (emotional injury must be "severe and
debilitating"); Paugh, 451 N.E2d at 765 (allowing recovery if the emotional distress is
"both severe and debilitating"). One court leans toward requiring a physical manifestation
of the emotional distress. E.g., Barnhill, 300 N.W.2d at 107-08 ("Compensable mental
distress should ordinarily be accompanied with physical manifestations of the distress.").
Other courts require a physical manifestation. E.g., Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 308
(N.H. 1979) (allowing recovery if plaintiff's emotional distress accompanied by "objective
physical symptoms"); Reilly, 547 A.2d at 897 (requiring "objective physical
symptomology"). Other courts have recently rejected this requirement. See, e.g., Culbert
v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438 (Me. 1982) ("Proof of physical
manifestations of the mental injury is no longer required."); Folz v. State, 797 P.2d 246,
259 (N.M. 1990) ("Physical manifestation should not be the sine qua non by which to
establish damages resulting from emotional trauma.").
199. Paugh, 457 N.E.2d at 765 (" 'Advancements in modem science lead us to ...
conclude that psychic injury is capable of being proven despite the absence of a physical
manifestation of such injury' ").
200. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 86, at 614.
201. Jeffrey O'Connell, Blending Reform of Tort Liability and Health Insurance: A
Necessary Mix, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1303, 1307 (citing MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour (PBS
television broadcast, Sept. 22, 1993)).
202. However, treatment could be useful as evidence of PTSD.
203. E.g., James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 115 (Neb. 1985) ("[O]f the three Dillon
factors the relationship between the plaintiff and victim is the most valuable in determining
foreseeability, and therefore the Most crucial.") (citing Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (N.J.
1986)).
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a familial or spousal relationship. Others are willing to draw the
line more broadly, usually on a case-by-case basis. 5
A third-party NIED rule requires a close relationship between a
plaintiff and the victim.' °6 A properly devised standard can serve
the conflicting concerns of limiting liability to negligent defendants
and allowing recovery to a psychically traumatized plaintiff.
The problem is that defining the parameters of such relationships
in a practical way is difficult. Simply sticking labels on relation-
ships-such as "legal" or "family"-does not help. The label attached
to the type of relationship the plaintiff had with the victim should
start the analysis, not end it. The loss of a friendship could be just as
devastating to a person as the loss of a spouse.'
5. Does not predicate recovery on artificially
narrow class of relationships
Courts generally impose rigid limits on the class of NIED
plaintiffs to include only those related by blood or with family ties to
the victim. This familial relationship has the apparent virtue of
creating a bright line that discourages frivolous and fraudulent
claims.0 Burley's test requires a court's determination that the
victim's and plaintiff's relationship "contain[s] the essence of familial
or spousal tie[s]."' a
204. E.g., Nugent v. Bauermeister, 489 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) ("[A]
plaintiff may recover ... only if the plaintiff is an immediate member of the victim's
family."); James, 375 N.W.2d at 115 ("[W]e will require that there be a marital or intimate
familial relationship...."); see also Ramirez, 673 P.2d at 825 ("[The] relationship between
the victim and the plaintiff [is] limited to husband and wife, parent and child, grandparent
and grandchild, brother and sister and to those persons who occupy a legitimate position
in loco parentis."); Gates, 719 P.2d at 199 (requiring that the plaintiff have the same degree
of kinship to victim as that required for a plaintiff in a wrongful death action).
205. E.g., Leong, 520 P.2d at 766 ("[T]he absence of a blood relationship between
victim and plaintiff-witness [should not] foreclose recovery."); Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 379
("The State's interest in marriage would not be harmed if unmarried cohabitants are
permitted to prove on a case-by-case basis that they enjoy a steadfast relationship ....").
206. E.g., Paugh, 451 N.E.2d at 767 (observing that psychic harm to bystander is more
foreseeable if bystander is closely related to the victim).
207. See Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355,359-60 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd
on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2408 (1994).
208. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 666, 771 P.2d at 828, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879; Nugent, 489
N.W.2d at 150; Ramirez, 673 P.2d at 825; James, 375 N.W.2d at 115.
209. Ramirez, 673 P.2d at 825 (limiting recovery to familial relations "in order to insure
that [the plaintiff] is actually foreseeable").
210. Burley, supra note 178, at 948.
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However, a plaintiff will also likely suffer severe emotional
distress if that person's close friend is injured.2 1 Some courts have
held that the state has a number of interests in denying recovery when
the victim has a "functional"-as opposed to actual-family relation-
ship with the plaintiff 212 such as promoting marriage,2 3 limiting
the legal consequences of a wrong to predictable and controllable
consequences, 2 4 and relieving courts of the onerous task of dissect-
ing a disputed relationship.2"5
Other courts are not as insistent upon blood or spousal relation-
ships.2 16 In Dunphy v. Gregor217 the New Jersey Supreme Court
did not find the policy considerations stated in Elden to be persua-
sive.218 First, denying recovery in NIED cases does not promote
marriage because people do not plan their lives around tort recovery
for accidents.2 9 Second, unmarried cohabitation prior to marriage
is a "widespread reality."'
The proposed test objectively examines the relationship to
determine the value to the parties, in order to determine if it was
reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would suffer compensable
severe emotional distress if the relationship was ended.
6. Permits evidence of nature and closeness of relationship
Familial relationships enjoy a presumption of high value because
they are linked together by more than mere biological and legal
relationships. 2 ' Family members and spouses enjoy unique rights
in many areas of the law not granted to nonfamily members.2'
211. See Gotshall, 988 F.2d at 359-60. Plaintiff was hospitalized and suffered from
PTSD when his friend died. Id.
212. Sollars v. City of Albuquerque, 794 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D.N.M. 1992) (citing with





216. Leong, 520 P.2d at 766 ("[T]he absence of a blood relationship between victim and
plaintiff-witness [should not] foreclose recovery."); Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 379.
217. 642 A.2d 372 (NJ. 1994).
218. Id. at 378-79.
219. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 281, 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
220. Id. at 280, 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
221. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503-04 (1977) (observing that families
act to inculcate "cherished values, moral and cultural").
222. See, e.g., Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 520,
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Because family relationships are very highly valued, the proposed
test presumes a close, affectionate, and enduring relationship if a
plaintiff has a familial relation with the victim. Under the proposed
test, family members include spouses, children of the plaintiff born in
and out of wedlock, adoptees, stepchildren, siblings, uncles, aunts,
cousins, grandparents, and grandchildren.
But families do not always love and care for each other according
to the accepted norm.m Therefore, a defendant faced with liability
for ending or injuring a familial relationship should have the
opportunity to prove that the relationship did not cause severe
emotional distress because it was not a valued relationship.
The proposed test recognizes that people may also have deeply
valued relationships although they are unrelated by blood, marriage,
or by law. 4  This example can include longtime friends' and
unmarried cohabitants.
These relationships do not have the legal rights and obligations
that tie families together.' Therefore, such relationships should
not enjoy a presumption of closeness. But the plaintiff should be able
to introduce evidence to show that the relationship at issue was
valued enough and its loss caused the plaintiff severe and compensa-
ble emotional distress.
213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 412 (1985) (holding that an insurance policy not covering the gay
partner of an insured employee "does not violate the equal protection clause of the
California Constitution"); Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 138 Cal. App. 3d 464,471,188 Cal.
Rptr. 31, 34-35 (1982) (holding no unlawful discrimination in refusing to allow a surviving
unmarried cohabitant to file wrongful death action); People v. Delph, 94 Cal. App. 3d 411,
415, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422, 424-25 (1979) (holding marital communications privilege in
evidence not applicable to unmarried couple). Even nonloving families can be held
together by very deep and powerful loyalties as manifested by such common expressions
as "blood is thicker than water."
223. See, e.g., Lauren E. Goldman, Note, Nonconfrontational Killings and the
Appropriate Use of Battered Child Syndrome Testimony: The Hazards of Subjective Self-
Defense and the Merits of Partial Excuse, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 185, 185 (1994) ("[Al
startling ninety percent [of parricides] are cases in which a child ends years of severe and
relentless abuse by killing an abusive parent.").
224. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 281 n.1, 758 P.2d at 591 n.1, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263 n.1
(Broussard, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that "[s]ome cohabital relationships serve [the
same functions] as do marriages, and are thus equally deserving of legal recognition and
protection").
225. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 359.
226. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378-79 (allowing recovery for an unmarried couple).
227. See cases cited supra note 222.
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7. Treats medical malpractice claims as accidents
Medical malpractice in California is treated as a breach of con-
tract.' But when a patient suffers a physical injury from malprac-
tice, the results can resemble an accident. 9 These consequences
have the inherent potential to cause emotional distress to those close
to the victim that goes far beyond mere breach of contract, A
fair test should allow plaintiffs to recover for (NIED) flowing from
medical malpractice if a victim suffers a terrible physical injury as a
result.
V. CONCLUSION
Emotional distress in day-to-day living is foreseeable. But severe,
compensable emotional distress is less so because the situations that
give rise to it are much more rare. The proposed test will guide
courts in determing how foreseeable the plaintiff's negligent infliction
of emotional distress (NIED) was in a given situation.
The proposed test will not satisfy those who crave mathematical
accuracy. It may expand NIED liability in some cases and contract
it in others. Allowing homosexual couples the chance to be treated
the same as heterosexual couples, as the proposed test will allow, may
offend some people. Other people may stubbornly believe that
allowing unmarried cohabitants to recover for NIED will undermine
228. See, e.g., Newton v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 184 Cal. App. 3d 386,392,228 Cal. Rptr.
890, 894 (1986) (finding "[tihe mother had a contract with [defendant] ... by which it
undertook, for consideration, to provide care and treatment for the delivery of a healthy
fetus").
229. See, e.g., Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461,463,563 P.2d 871,872,138 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 316 (1977) (observing that because of negligent administration of anesthesia,
plaintiffs 16-year-old son "had been reduced to the mental age of three, suffered total
blindness and severe impairment of his hearing, and partial paralysis of his right side");
Mobaldi v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 578, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720,723
(1976) (observing that plaintiffs adopted son "suffered irreversible brain damage and was
made permanently blind and quadriplegic, severely retarded, subject to seizures, and
generally comatose" from an injection of 50% glucose solution), overruled on other
grounds by Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 15
(1977); Harris v. Tatum, 455 S.E.2d 124, 126 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (observing plaintiff lost
a foot as a result of blood clot that lodged there after angioplasty); Reager v. Anderson,
371 S.E.2d 619, 622-23 (W. Va. 1988) (finding 13-year-old boy lost a leg because of
physicians' failure to treat "compartmental syndrome").
230. See Mobaldi, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 578, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 723 (observing plaintiff
mother lost 40 pounds and "suffered from insomnia, despair, and futility to the extent that
she sometimes became bedridden").
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"family values" and make marriage, and the order it imposes, less
attractive. Also, critics disposed to worry about the jury's sympathy
will continue to worry.
The proposed test only tries to deal with the world as it is. The
proposed test provides at least a basic framework for examining such
a relationship. It does not answer the question as to whether a
plaintiff who had a thirty-year live-in relationship with the victim is
any more or less deserving of NIED recovery than a plaintiff who had
a three-month-long, stormy marriage to a victim. Family relationships
are presumed to be close, affectionate and enduring relationships
(CAERs) under the proposed test because people-and the
law-presume them to be so."3  However, in the real world,
people's day-to-day analyses of the relationships of others do not stop
there and neither should the law's.
The proposed test should provide a way for courts to examine a
type of injury that seems speculative or ethereal. But there is nothing
speculative or ethereal about suffering as a result of terrible injuries
to people we care deeply about. Psychiatrists have analyzed the
problem of traumatic stress and devised criteria that should be of
great help to courts and juries.'
The proposed test helps to remove a fundamental absurdity from
California's NIED jurisprudence. Courts show great deference to the
feelings of relatives of the deceased whose remains are mishandled or
misplaced. The death of a loved one is a very difficult experience in
a person's life. 3 The aggrieved relatives are given broad latitude
in recovery; they need not be present at the "scene" nor must they
actually see the misfeasance.' However, also under California's
current NIED jurisprudence, a mother who comes upon her injured
child in the middle of the road after the child was struck by a car will
not be permitted to recover for emotional distress.25' If that mother
231. See supra part IV.A.3.
232. Unless a person simply does not trust psychiatry.
233. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
(DSM-III-R) 11 (1987) [hereinafter DSM-llI-R]. For adults, the death of a spouse is rated
as an "extreme" stressor, the death of a child is even worse, rated as "catastrophic." Id.
For children and adolescents, the death of a parent is an "extreme" stressor; the death of
both parents is "catastrophic." Id. The "Severity of Psychosocial Stressors Scale" was not
included in DSM-III-R's successor, DSM-IV. However, its usefulness to people not in the
mental health professions as a general indicator of stress made it appropriate to inclide
here.
234. See supra part IV.C.1.
235. See Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
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must care for a child maimed in the accident, she will likely suffer
very gravely. 6  No doubt that all the sufferers described here
endure genuine emotional distress. To permit recovery for mishan-
dling a dead person's remains while refusing to do so when the victim
is still living and suffering is patently absurd. To deny recovery to
one person because he or she did not happen to be married to the
victim while allowing recovery for another who was divorcing the
victim is equally absurd.
For these reasons, I propose an NIED test that requires that (1)
the victim to suffer a fatal, disfiguring, permanently crippling injury
or one that requires the victim to endure a long recovery period; (2)
the plaintiff suffer Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result
of the victim's injuries; and (3) the victim and plaintiff had a close,
affectionate and enduring relationship (CAER) that was destroyed or
damaged as a result of the victim's injury.
The proposed test is not a real solution to the problem of helping
people who are traumatized by accidents or medical malpractice.
While the test is better than nothing, money damages do not make
people whole from mental or physical injury. 7 The problem is that
when a person is "injured or incapacitated, a great deal of caregiving
work is necessary. "2' The traditional caregivers, the victim's family,
friends or religious institution, will suffer as well, both from the
burden of caring for the victim and their own sorrow at the victim's
condition. 9 But it seems unfair for people who had nothing to do
with causing the accident to bear the consequences. Perhaps the
greatest problem is that our culture and economy tend to marginalize
caregivers and care-giving activity.2'
One antidote would be to resist the law's present impulse to
place dollar values on everything at the moment and consider long-
term costs. There will always be people who will complain about the
costs of caregiving. Accidents and their aftermath cost a great deal
because we lose when our neighbors suffer. This may be partly out
of a selfish realization that we could have been in our neighbors'
place. Technical devices like automobiles magnify our ability to
236. See DSM-II-R, supra note 233, at 11. A "serious chronic illness in self or child"
is rated as an "extreme" stressor, like the death of a spouse. IaL
237. See Bender, supra note 17, at 872-75.
238. md. at 905.
239. See supra part IV.A.2.
240. See Bender, supra note 17, at 905 (noting that hired caregivers are "usually lower
class women who are paid too little and given no prestige for this vital work").
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
perform the chores of living, but they can also give us the ability to
cause terrible harm. We should consider our collective responsibility
to care for each other, and by extension, ourselves.
David Paul Bleistein*
* I dedicate this piece to my family, who freely offered me a great deal of psychic
help through law school; my mother, Jeanne Dering Bleistein; my father, Paul J. Bleistein;
and my brother, Steven R. Bleistein. I also dedicate this piece to the staff and editors on
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review who polished this piece with their collective grit.
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